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Abstract
Complex regulatory decisions about risk rely on the brokering of evidence between
providers and recipients, and involve personality and power relationships that influence the
confidence that recipients may place in the sufficiency of evidence and, therefore, the
decision outcome. We explore these relationships in an agent-based model; drawing on
concepts from environmental risk science, decision psychology and computer simulation. A
two-agent model that accounts for the sufficiency of evidence is applied to decisions about
salt intake, animal carcass disposal and radioactive waste. A dynamic version of the model
assigned personality traits to agents, to explore their receptivity to evidence. Agents with
2‘aggressor’ personality sets were most able to imbue fellow agents with enhanced receptivity
(with ‘avoider’ personality sets less so) and clear confidence in the sufficiency of evidence.
In a dynamic version of the model, when both recipient and provider were assigned the
‘aggressor’ personality set, this resulted in 10 successful evidence submissions in 71 days,
compared with 96 days when both agents were assigned the ‘avoider’ personality set. These
insights suggest implications for improving the efficiency and quality of regulatory decision
making by understanding the role of personality and power.
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1. Introduction
Complex regulatory decisions on risk rely on the provision, scrutiny and acceptance of
scientific evidence. Davies et al. (2010) explain how evidence is brokered (received,
processed and passed on) between actors - a regulatee and regulator for example - in order to
assess the significance of risks and inform decisions on how they should be managed (Oxera,
2000). As evidence is exchanged between organisations and promoted through a decision
hierarchy towards the ultimate decision maker, intermediate recipients judge the sufficiency
of evidence for those aspects of the decision they are accountable for. Only when deemed
sufficient is evidence passed on to others for a similar interrogation. In regulatory settings,
the recipients of evidence may also hold and exercise power over the provider with respect to
its sufficiency. As a contribution to the smarter regulation debate (Better Regulation
Commission, 2006; Gouldson et al., 2009; Hutter, 2005; Taylor et al., 2012; 2013) we are
interested in how regulatory confidence in risk-informed decisions is instilled as evidence is
brokered between parties. We suggest that agent-based tools may help researchers explore
relationships between evidence, personality and power (Davies et al., 2010). Here, we
3describe a research tool for this purpose and test its applicability in the complex environment
of regulatory decision-making using three case studies.
Agent-based modelling simulates the relationships between actors participating in
complex decisions (Courdier et al., 2002; Chaturvedi et al., 2000; Kurahashi and Terano,
2005). It has been used in the environmental sciences to explore negotiations on groundwater
management (Feuillette at al., 2003), the effectiveness of greenbelt allocation in periurban
settings (Brown et al., 2004), forest management strategies (Nute et al., 2004) and pine beetle
infestation (Perez and Dragicevic, 2010). By combining knowledge about choice, so-called
‘automated decision makers’ can partially represent human interactions by accounting for the
behaviours and makeup of actors. Using these tools, scholars have modelled the influence of
personality (a factor of individual difference; Alavizadeh et al., 2008; Canuto et al., 2005;
Ghasem-Aghaee and Ören, 2007; Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2008, 2009) and power (a factor
of the interactions between individuals; Cincotti and Guerci et al., 2005; Marreiros et al.,
2008; Prada and Paiva, 2009) on decision making.
Applications that explore how agents broker scientific evidence between one another
are limited (Chen et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2010). Scholars have, however, simulated the
effectiveness of trading agents (Haddawy et al., 2004), investigating the effectiveness of
auctions (Bohte et al., 2001; Mizuta and Steiglitz, 2000; Mizuta and Yamagata, 2001), buyer
coalition schemes (Yamamoto and Sycara, 2001) and trade brokering (Alkemade et al.,
2003). Agents mimic brokering by representing an exchange of information between parties
to a decision. In models of financial trade, analogous here to the exchange of evidence,
agents are the buyers and sellers of a commodity. Successful trades demonstrate small
fluctuations over time. In regulatory decision-making, a recipient of evidence (usually the
regulator) who gives positive feedback to the provider of evidence (the regulatee, operator)
might increase the provider’s understanding of what is expected of a regulatory submission
4(e.g. an environmental safety case). This may mean fewer fluctuations in the recipient’s view
about the sufficiency of the evidence submitted, with a possibility for smoother regulatory
approvals as an outcome for both parties – a successful ‘trade’ of evidence and increased
confidence on behalf of the recipient. Conceptualising the role of receptivity about
knowledge is not new. Both knowledge creation and transfer are dependent on transparency
and receptivity (Larsson et al., 1998), some claiming these as key to building trust (McCole,
2002), to effective communication (Tsali et al., 2008) and as determinants of inter-partner
learning (Hamel, 1991). In short, establishing interpersonal relations through receptivity and
transparency encourages the free flow of information (Tsai et al., 2008).
Bringing the features of real-world regulatory decisions on risk, personality and power
together within an agent-based model is challenging and we are cautious about claims to
reproduce the complexities of multi-agent decisions. Arthur (1998) comments on the reality
of economics via-à-vis our attempts to model the flows and interactions between agents:
“[…] the economy itself emerges from our subjective beliefs. These
subjective beliefs, taken in aggregate, structure the micro economy. They
give rise to the character of financial markets. They direct flows of capital
and govern strategic behaviour and negotiations. They are the DNA of the
economy. These subjective beliefs are a-priori or deductively indeterminate
in advance. They co-evolve, arise, decay, change, mutually reinforce, and
mutually negate. Subject and object cannot be neatly separated. And so the
economy shows behaviour that we can best describe as organic, rather than
mechanistic. It is not a well-ordered, gigantic machine. It is organic. At all
levels it contains pockets of indeterminacy. It emerges from subjectivity and
falls back into subjectivity.”
5Modestly, we are concerned with whether relationships between evidence, people
(personality) and power (structures) can be represented in an agent-based model to
examine regulatory decisions: (i) can we construct such a model?; (ii) can it
represent power structures and information flows?; (iii) can we represent the
influence of personality traits and decision context on decision outcome? We
explore these questions in a two-agent model incorporating the prior art on power
(French and Raven, 1959) and personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992) alongside
expert knowledge captured from case study interviews.
2. Methods and model development
A proof of concept model was designed by reference to three case studies from Davies
et al. (2010). The flow of evidence between parties to these decisions (regulatees, their
professional advisors, regulators and their advisors, the final decision-maker) was mapped
according to Oxera (2000). A two-agent model was then designed to represent the receptivity
of recipients (the regulator) to the evidence submitted by a provider (the regulatee, or
operator). Having tested its functionality, a dynamic version of the model was attempted,
accounting for receptivity between parties and, by inference, the degree of recipient
confidence in the evidence brokered to inform risk decisions.
2.1 Scoping study – characterising the brokering of evidence
Prior to model design, open-ended interviews (n=5) were conducted with regulators to
obtain generalised insights on the brokering of evidence in regulatory decision-making. The
researcher (GJD) assured confidentiality before recording interviews, asking respondents to
explain their expert role and the brokering process. Interviews revealed the real-life
complexities that characterise the flow of information within decisions, which are not
6represented in decision diagrams or risk frameworks. Field notes and interviews were
transcribed and used to support development of lengthier semi-structured interviews and the
agent-based model described below.
2.2 Case study selection and decision routes
The research utilised three of six candidate case studies. These three were chosen
because they reflected a range of conditions for the brokering of evidence (Table 1) and
provided access to willing participants: (1) the regulatory review of a post-closure safety case
for low-level nuclear waste disposal (denoted NW; an environmental permitting decision);
(2) the disposal of avian influenza infected animal carcasses (AI; a planning decision under
emergency conditions) and (3) the proposal to reduce levels of dietary salt intake (SI; a
policy development decision).
Evidence in the NW case study passes through a well-defined decision framework and
embodies high levels of scientific uncertainty, given the need to examine radioactive releases
to the biosphere over geological time. In contrast, the SI case study involved relatively
undisputed evidence about harm, but uncertainty around the optimal policy intervention
required to manage risk. The AI case study was concerned with an emergency response
where the evidence being brokered was for emergency planning purposes in anticipation of
relatively ‘novel’ risks. For each case study, peer reviewed and grey literature was used to
inform the directional flow of evidence and individual decision accountabilities. The
decision route for each case study was drafted using the structures in Oxera (2000), mapping
the flow of evidence and noting the role played by various actors.
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1. Risk associated with the disposal of infected animal carcasses (AI) X X X
2. Risk associated with the dietary salt intake (SI) X X X
3. Risk associated with nuclear waste disposal (NW) X X X X
4. Risk associated with an outbreak of blue-tongue disease X X X X
5. Risk associated with seasonal flooding X X X
6. Risk associated with the disposal of hazardous waste to landfill X X X
2.3 In-depth interviews
Semi-structured interviews (n=3) were then conducted with experts for each case study
to validate the decision routes above. Experts’ feedback improved early drafts and validated
the formal exchange of evidence between provider and recipient agents (Figure 1). During
the exploratory interviews, it became clear the sufficiency of evidence was, in part,
determined by how it was characterised by six factors. Accordingly, the experts were asked
to break decisions down into constituent phases on a timeline, and rate the extent to which the
evidence could be characterised as being qualitative, quantitative, political, social, technical
and costly. Information was used to construct the subsequent two-agent model.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1. Example decision route for the disposal of avian influenza (AI) infected carcasses,
having validated the flow and exchange of evidence between ‘provider’ and ‘recipient’.
Ultimate decision-maker is shown as Secretary of State (SoS; Davies, 2010), where TSE,
SEAC and DoH refers to ‘Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy’, ‘Spongiform
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee’ and Department of Health respectively.
82.4 Representing lines of evidence
The evidence used to test a hypothesis about the significance of a risk and how it
should be managed is rarely uniform in direction, strength or weight (see Linkov et al., 2009).
Evidence is frequently nested, in that evidence supporting a high-level ‘parent’ hypothesis is
often contingent on lower level ‘child’ hypotheses with their associated lines of evidence. To
represent this structure, we employed the TESLA™ software (http://www.quintessa-
online.com/TESLA/; Benbow et al., 2006; Quintessa, 2008). TESLA adopts evidence
support logic and interval probability theory to represent how lines of evidence inform a
group decision; say, on the risks of radioactive release from a waste repository over time
(Figure 2). TESLA disaggregates a decision into a hierarchy of parent and child hypotheses,
for which an expert group - reflecting on how sufficient and necessary a child hypothesis is
for answering a corresponding parent - determines the influence the available evidence has.
In this way, ‘degrees of belief’ that support (+) or refute (-) a parent hypothesis are
constructed, with uncommitted belief also being captured (Figure 2), the sum of these
weights equating to 1 (100% belief).
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 2. TESLA representation of parent and child hypotheses for radioactive waste
disposal (adapted from Quintessa, 2008).
Adapting TESLA, we assumed each hypothesis has an agent – a recipient with
responsibility for interrogating the evidence submitted to them. Regulatory staff in different
positions of authority have variable degrees of power to determine the sufficiency and
adequacy of evidence submitted in support of a belief – say about the operational safety of an
industrial facility.
92.5 A deterministic two-agent model incorporating receptivity
A two-agent model to simulate the understanding above was developed using North
and Macal (2007). Receptivity facilitates knowledge sharing (Deng, 2007; Wang et al., 2008;
2009) and the opposite of receptivity is resistance (Kearney, 2007). Agent receptivity was
represented through the assignment of weights (see Appendix for conditional logic) for
personality and power influences (Davies et al., 2010), and for the receipt, processing and
passing-on of evidence, with an overall receptivity weight derived. An interface allowed the
user to vary the conditions for the recipient’s receptivity for a set of scenarios (see
Supplementary Information Table A1 and Figure A1). Spread sheet layers, represented in
Figure 3, drew on values set through the interface and performed 10 000 runs for recipients’
receptivity under selected scenarios. The mean receptivity (with standard deviation) was
estimated using three steps:
1. Intensity ranges were assigned to factors (personality and power, and the level of decision
uncertainty) that influenced recipient receptivity.
2. The model selected values at random within these ranges using the random number
generator within MS Excel®.
3. Values (0-1) were propagated through the receptivity model to generate a weight for the
receipt, processing and passing-on stages, before being averaged to generate an overall
recipient receptivity.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
Figure 3. Logical flow of the deterministic two-agent model.
Levels of intensity were selected for agents’ personality traits. The ‘big five’ traits
(openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroticism), said to represent
the most stable characteristics of individuals over time were employed, with ‘neuroticism’
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replaced by ‘emotional stability’ (the reverse of ‘neuroticism’) allowing a scoring of traits
uniform in direction (Johnson, 1999; Costa and McCrae, 1992). Scholars scoring personality
traits do so on a scale from 0 to 100, agreeing that scores 55 or higher are considered to
exhibit a strong dimension in that trait. Those that score 45 or below are considered to
exhibit the opposite effect. Trait scores between 45 and 55 fall within the standard deviation
of the big five personality test (Barrick et al., 1998; Digman, 1990; Ghasem-Aghee and Ören,
2007; Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999). Trait scores were assigned for recipient and provider,
representing agent’s motivation to process information systematically and to share this
knowledge (Davies et al., 2010; Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999). Here, the conventional
degrees of intensity (low, medium and high) were refined to six levels to investigate the
influence of decision uncertainty (Table 2a,b). This allowed the user to better represent the
case studies by low to high levels of decision uncertainty.
Table 2(a,b) Levels of intensity characterising (a) decision uncertainty; and (b) personality
trait, where “Random” refers to the option to select values using a random number generator.
(a) Levels of intensity used to characterise decision uncertainty.
Very high (VH) 0.83 to 0.99
High (H) 0.66 to 0.82
High medium (HM) 0.50 to 0.66
Low medium (LM) 0.33 to 0.50
Low (L) 0.17 to 0.33
Very low (VL) 0 to 0.16
Random 0 to 0.99
(b) Levels of intensity used to characterise each personality trait
Very high (VH) 0.775 to 1
High (H) 0.55 to 0.775
High medium (HM) 0.50 to 0.55
Low medium (LM) 0.45 to 0.50
Low (L) 0.225 to 0.45
Very low (VL) 0 to 0.225
Random 0 to 1
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2.6 A dynamic two-agent model incorporating personality and power
Finally, we attempted a dynamic version of the model to incorporate a two-way
interaction (dialogue) between provider and recipient and explore the confidence that might
be instilled in recipients about the adequacy of evidence submitted to them. In interviews,
experts explained how recipients and providers negotiate and reach consensus about the
adequacy of evidence. We were interested whether the model could represent this process.
Agent receptivity in the dynamic model was represented using the logic set out in the
deterministic model, although three rather than six levels of intensity were used. Legitimate
power and referent power were also incorporated. Legitimate power reflects the limited
period recipients are permitted to engage with providers. The model assumed a consultation
consisted of one submission of evidence per day. The number of days’ consultation was set
by the value of the recipient’s legitimate power, which decreased by a value of ‘1’ with each
simulation run. Referent power was reflected by including this within agent’s assessment of
receptivity. An agent’s referent power was assessed by taking the average of the agent’s
agreeableness and emotional stability.
Using suitable combinations of the ‘big five’ personality traits above, agents were
assigned one of four personalities (‘negotiator’, ‘aggressor’, ‘submissive’ and ‘avoider’;
Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2008; 2009; Santos et al., 2010). To achieve this, each of the big
five personality traits, for each agent, was assigned a low, medium or high value (0 – 0.45,
0.45 – 0.55 and 0.55 – 1 respectively). Because the literature does not specify for certain the
intensity for the four personality sets, a level of intensity was selected from a uniform
distribution and maintained within this band for subsequent simulations, as illustrated in
Table 3 for the “Agent environment” spread sheet.
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Table 3. Showing relative levels of intensity (low, medium and high) assigned to each
personality, where “Random” refers to the option to select a value at random between 0 and 1
using the MS Excel® random number generator.
Personality Big five personality traits
Openness Conscientiousness Extroversion Agreeableness Emotional
stability
Negotiator Random Medium High Medium Medium
Aggressor Random High High Medium Medium
Submissive Random Low Low Medium Medium
Avoider Random Low Low Random Low
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) code was used to update an “Agent
environment” spread sheet according to changes in the agents’ personal information in the
model (Figure 4) and contextual issues derived from a “Scenario” spread sheet; before
receptivity was estimated and stored in a “Data log” spread sheet. For every run, a new
random value was generated within the same band for each personality trait. Updating the
recipient’s and provider’s personal information (Figure 4) reflected the variance in the
expression of personality across different decision contexts (Costa and McCrae, 1992).
Overall receptivity was estimated using an average of receptivity across each of the three
stages – the receiving, processing and passing-on stage of evidence brokering.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
Figure 4. Sequence of events for updating agents’ receptivity according to changes in
personal information.
The model dynamics incorporated four stages simulating the transaction of evidence
from provider to recipient (Figure 5). The extent to which a transaction is successful
depended on how the evidence was characterised by the parties (qualitative, quantitative,
political, social, technical and costly aspects). If the recipient and provider expectations
match, the brokering is successful and the recipient’s confidence in the ‘trade’ builds.
[INSERT FIGURE 5]
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Figure 5. Logic for the confidence building exercise with questions asked by the agent-based
model sequentially in a clockwise order.
The provider submitted evidence in support of their belief, and the recipient evaluated the
adequacy of the evidence, their confidence in it and thereby the sufficiency of the provider’s
belief (Figure 5, stage 1). Where these matched, the recipient was considered to have 100%
confidence in the trade. Where there was a mismatch (Figure 5, stage 2), these weights were
multiplied against the recipient’s weights and the ratio between new and the initial sum of
recipients weights subtracted from the value of 1 (100%) and multiplied by one hundred to
represent recipients increased confidence in the adequacy of evidence. If the recipient had
legitimate power and the evidence failed to instil the recipient with 100% confidence, the
recipient would engage in consultation with the provider. The evidence was passed back to
the provider; a corollary of a request for additional information or further work from a
regulatee (Figure 5, stage 3). Taking the average of the recipient’s receptivity and the
provider’s receptivity indicated how likely the provider would be to understand the
expectations of the recipient (Figure 5, stage 4). If this value fell between 0.15 & 0.38, 0.38
& 0.57 or 0.57 & 0.92 then the provider was considered to have a low, medium or high
chance (respectively) of understanding how the recipient’s expectations. This was expressed
in the model by generating a random value for each aspect of the evidence between 0 & 1,
0.33 & 1 or 0.66 & 1 respectively; allowing the provider a greater chance of weighting the
evidence adequately. This random value was generated within the specified range for each
type of evidence characterising the new submission. These were then multiplied against the
remaining weights that the recipient had assigned to each types of evidence before
recalculating recipients confidence. This represented the extent to which a new submission
would meet the recipient’s expectations. If the recipient had legitimate power and the new
14
submission of evidence failed to instil 100% confidence, the recipient would engage in
further consultation with the provider (Figure 5, go around the loop again) until they lacked
legitimate power to do so or were 100% confident in the adequacy of the submitted evidence.
This process was captured in a series of subroutines called up in a logical order (see
Supplementary Information Figure, A2&3, Table A2). An iteration of evidence between
recipient and provider was allowed to continue until a ‘Do While/Loop’ function in VBA
determined the number of simulations were complete (representing the extent of the
recipient’s legitimate power).
3. Results
We present three sets of results: (i) recipient agents’ receptivity as represented in the
deterministic model; (ii) how agent personality differs in its predisposition toward
‘propensity to trust’, ‘trustworthiness’, ‘motivation to process evidence’ and ‘motivation to
share knowledge’ which are used to represent agent receptivity; (iii) demonstrating how
recipient and provider agents with greatest and least capacity to build receptivity also express
greatest and least capacity to build confidence.
3.1 Recipient receptivity to evidence submitted
Figure 6 illustrates how the recipient and provider have either a positive or negative
impact on the recipient’s receptivity to a provider’s belief, as supported by the evidence they
submit. Each bar represents a mean of 10,000 recipient receptivity values, for 13 scenarios
across the three case studies. Moving from left to the right (Figure 6), the first bar represents
the control where intensity levels were randomly set between 0 and 1. Each subsequent
cluster of four bars represents the low, medium and high levels of decision uncertainty and
legitimate power for the salt intake (SI), carcase disposal (AI) and radioactive waste (RW)
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case studies, in turn. Bars within each cluster represent the recipient’s receptivity under the
following conditions:
 (dotted bar) both recipient and provider agents are set to have a negative impact on
recipient’s receptivity (R- & P-);
 (hashed bar) both recipient and provider agents are set to have a positive impact on
recipient’s receptivity (R+ & P+);
 (net) recipient and provider agent are set to have a negative and positive impact on
recipient’s receptivity, respectively (R+ & P-); and
 (vertical stripe) recipient and provider agents are set to have a positive and negative
impact on recipient’s respectively (R+ & P-).
[INSERT FIGURE 6]
Figure 6. Mean recipient’s receptivity for 13 scenarios, with error bars representing standard
deviation.
The error bars represent standard deviation and show the difference between the mean
receptivity when values for each parameter were selected at random between 0 and 1 (the
control) and the mean receptivity in the situation where both the recipient and the provider
was predisposed toward imbuing the recipient with receptivity (the second bar in each
cluster). In all clusters, the recipient is seen to have the greatest impact on recipient
receptivity, by comparing the third and fourth bar in each cluster. Also, the influence agents
have on recipient receptivity increases with the presence of decision uncertainty, reflecting
the impact of agent’s motivation to process and share knowledge.
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3.2 The dynamic model – the role of personality
Four personality sets were investigated; the ‘negotiator’, ‘aggressor’, ‘submissive’
and ‘avoider’. These gave a broad indication of the model’s capacity to simulate agent
receptivity. The ‘avoider’ personality was split into avoider-low and avoider-high referring
to high and low measures of agreeableness respectively, testing the model’s capability to
represent an agents’ propensity to trust and trustworthiness. Figure 7a-c illustrates that the
avoider-low personality, with a low measure of agreeableness, produced the least propensity
to trust and trustworthiness.
[INSERT FIGURE 7(a-c)]
Figure 7. Showing relative measures of (a) propensity to trust, (b) trustworthiness and (c)
referent power for each of the four personalities in the two agent model. Where ‘avoider-
high’ and ‘avoider-low’ personality is being calculated with high and low measures of
agreeableness and emotional stability respectively.
Figure 8 illustrates the frequency of weights being generated over 10,000 runs under
the best and worst circumstances for agents motivated to process and share knowledge.
Agents’ motivation to process knowledge was dependent on their orientation toward
uncertainty (Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999). Agents with high levels of openness are
uncertainty-motivated. Agents low in openness were said to be certainty-orientated. This
meant that when uncertainty and openness were either both high or both low, they were
motivated to process knowledge. An agent’s motivation to share knowledge, however, was
dependent on how motivated agents were to process the evidence. If either agent was highly
motivated to process the evidence (or both were unmotivated), this resulted in agents being
poorly motivated to share knowledge. If agents were unequally motivated to process the
evidence they were more motivated to share knowledge (Cheng, unpublished).
[INSERT FIGURE 8]
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Figure 8. Boxplots showing low (1), medium (2) and high (3) values generated for
motivation to process evidence and motivation to share knowledge.
These results reflect the literature on the propensity to trust, trustworthiness and
referent power. Table 4 shows that the aggressor and the avoider-low personality generated
greatest and least propensity to trust, trustworthiness and referent power respectively,
Table 4. Personalities that generate the ‘most’ and ‘least’ propensity to trust, trustworthiness
and referent power.
Personality
Negotiator Aggressor Submissive Avoider-low
Propensity to trust ‘Most’ √ √‘Least’ √
Trustworthiness ‘Most’ √‘Least’ √
Referent power ‘Most’ √ √ √‘Least’ √
Figure 9 shows the different rates at which confidence was gained as recipients and
providers engaged in dialogue under the best (top schematics; a) and worst (bottom
schematics; b) case scenarios. At the onset of dialogue, the level of recipient’s confidence
varies, just as the rate at which confidence is attained varied for each submission. Even with
this element of uncertainty, the model is able to distinguish between the best and worst case
scenario over 10 submissions of evidence (where the recipient must gain 100% confidence in
the adequacy of supporting evidence before fully accepting the sufficiency of the providers
belief, and where recipients have unlimited legitimate power). The distinction between
agents with personalities predisposed to being receptive and imbuing others with receptivity
(and those that are not) is seen to affect the rate of the confidence building by: the rate at
which the recipient’s confidence builds over time, resulting in 10 submissions being
completed in 71 rather than 96 days (i.e. 26% more efficient).
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[INSERT FIGURE 9]
Figure 9 (a,b). Confidence gained over multiple submissions of evidence (a) where both
recipient and provider agents’ personalities are predisposed to being receptive; and (b) where
both are not predisposed to being receptive.
4. Discussion
The nature of regulation is under review as western Governments move towards a
more facilitative, decentralised approach (Gunningham, 2009; Pollard et al., 2009). This
raises issues about the tone of regulatory exchange, the quality of evidence that supports
environmental risk decisions and the skill sets required of regulatory staff. For the regulated,
the same applies – those seeking earned recognition by going beyond compliance (Taylor et
al., 2012; 2013) need a new style of exchange. So how evidence is brokered, by whom, and
under what conditions matters for beneficial regulatory, business and environmental
outcomes. Using conventional approaches to ethnographic research with the intent of
observing regulator-regulatee interactions up close is rarely practical. Agent-based
approaches may have merit in revealing the influences at work when evidence to support
decisions is provided to regulators, discussed and its suitability for informing decisions
considered.
Classically, agent-based models focus on how complex dynamics and outcomes rely
on the network of interactions between agents. They have been built using techniques such
as discrete event simulation and object orientated programming (Brailsford and Schnidt,
2003) that reproduce the critical features of complex systems using component level rules.
‘Behavioural signatures’ can be allocated to individual agents (Epstein, 2006; North and
Macal, 2007) offering a social richness and behavioural realism (Mischel, 1999; Mischel and
Shoda,, 1995; Shoda, 1999; 2002) difficult to capture in conventional decision analytics. Our
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two-agent model is rudimentary, but suggests how transactions between parties might
influence a recipient’s receptivity towards the evidence that subsequently informs a decision
on risk. The two-agent model is shown capable, at least in principle, of exploring a
recipient’s tendency to trust, and the influence this has on their receptivity and the rate at
which confidence can be gained.
To demonstrate the breadth of behaviour captured within the deterministic model, the
most optimistic and pessimistic scenarios were simulated by making changes in system
parameters; revealing the influence underlying features had on agent receptivity. As a form
of validation, this was carried out for a number of scenarios, illustrating how the model
reflects aspects of environmental permitting (NW), policy development (SI) and emergency
planning decisions (AI). Recipient receptivity was highest for the former, which was
expected given the greater level of uncertainty. Agents with high openness to experience
providing evidence (characterised by high uncertainty) to agents with low openness to
experience had high and low motivation to process information, respectively, and were highly
motivated to share knowledge (Cheng, unpublished; Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999;
Sorrentino et al., 1992). It is also seen that recipient receptivity had a greater influence than
provider receptivity (Figure 6), suggesting the hierarchical model of receptivity is able to
represent some of the trends explained to us by experts.
Model dynamics were developed by assigning agents specific personalities and
drawing parallels between the brokering of evidence and of commodities on a financial
market. Agents wishing to exchange a commodity (here, confidence) must determine
whether bids for the commodity are acceptable (i.e. whether provider and recipient
expectations about the weight of evidence relevant to the decision are matched). Eventually,
when the buyer (provider) makes an acceptable bid (a submission of adequately weighted
evidence), the seller (recipient) exchanges the commodity for a specified currency (here,
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confidence translating into units of sufficiency about the evidence submitted to them).
Accounting for the provider’s receptivity is an important extension of the deterministic two
agent model. Experts in the interviews explained how inexperienced regulatees (providers)
may miss opportunities, during regulatory exchange, to instil recipient regulators with
confidence by failing to communicate the weight of evidence supporting a risk decision –
instead, evidence was presented in binary terms. Our model interpreted the provider’s
receptivity as the extent to which the agent would ‘grasp what was being asked of them’
through the regulatory exchange (Figure 9). Similarly, Gratch et al (2009) shows how
recipients engaging in intelligible conversation have a better chance of imparting knowledge.
This understanding of recipient and provider receptivity was employed in our model to
determine the likelihood that (1) recipients would openly divulge how they wanted the
evidence to be weighted; and (2) that the provider would comprehend this.
By giving agents sets of personality characteristics we showed that overall, the
aggressor and the avoider personality had the greatest and least potential to influence agent
receptivity. The ‘avoider’ personality set built confidence at a slower rate than the
‘aggressor’; the latter suggesting the recipient personality set was less open to divulging what
types of evidence they require, and for the provider suggesting a personality set less attentive
to what was being asked of them. The pessimistic scenario, represented an agent that would
not seek out engagement with a provider, compared to the optimistic scenario representing an
agent that would. In Figure 9a&b this is shown to affect the rate of confidence building.
Whilst this succeeds in demonstrating the extremes of the dynamic model, we are not
suggesting the ‘aggressor’ personality set is the ideal for all recipient transactions.
In the dynamic model the rate at which the regulator’s confidence increased with time
influenced confidence building. Experts told us that the rate of confidence building also
varied for the three case studies. In the radioactive waste case, confidence would build at a
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slower rate because of the greater level of uncertainty characterising the decision. In our
model this was mostly reflected by the influence of an agent’s motivation to process and
share knowledge between the pessimistic and the optimistic scenarios.
Having demonstrated a ‘proof of concept’ two-agent model, we believe it possible to
develop a fully-fledged multi-agent system for the full set of interactions in Figure 1, say.
This would allow us to fully map the decision processes that have been validated by the
experts and create ‘behavioural signatures’ to distinguish between agents in different
positions within each decision hierarchy (see Mischel, 1999; Mischel and Shoda, 1995;
Shoda, 1999; Shoda et al., 2002). Moreover, we have not fully explored the use of
dependency in TESLA™. By applying the concept of dependency during the exchange of
evidence, we might allow agents to evaluate new evidence only, making the transaction more
realistic.
5. Conclusions
This paper demonstrates it is possible to construct a two-agent model to reflect
authentic regulatory situations, personality influences and power structures on information
flows. Existing risk frameworks pay little homage to the reality that decisions are made by
people, and as such, frameworks can fail to account for the influence power and personality
may have on the brokering of evidence that supports decisions about risk (Powell, 1999).
Here, an exploratory research tool capable of mapping the logic of how evidence is brokered,
and confidence built, was developed. Simulation of personalities sets generating the greatest
and least agent receptivity (and thereby for building confidence) in this model were found to
be the ‘aggressor’ and ‘avoider’ personality. Comparing the most optimistic and pessimistic
scenario the former was able to complete 10 successful submissions in 71 days (compared
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with 96 days).
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Appendix
Equations (1) and (2) were used to calculate agent receptivity. The values assigned to the
personality traits (i.e. openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, emotional
stability) depended in the personality assigned to the agent.
(1) R.Receptivity = (R.PtT + R.MtP + P.Tw + P.RP)/3
(2) P.Receptivity = (R.Tw + R.RP + P.PtT + P.MtP + R.Mts)/4
Where:
R.PtT = (RE+ RA+ RES)/3
R.Tw = (RC+RA)/2
P.PtT = (PE+PA+PES)/3
P.Tw = (PC+PA)/2
P.RP = (PA+PES)/2
R.RP = (RA+RES)/2
  0.6 ≤ X ≤ 0.99 If (RO > 0.55 and Unc > 0.6) or ( RO < 0.45 and Unc < 0.29) 
R.MtP =  0 ≤ X ≤ 0.29 If (RO > 0.55 and Unc < 0.29) or (RO < 0.45 and Unc > 0.6) 
  0.3 ≤ X ≤ 0.59  
Where X߳ℝ
  0.6 ≤ X ≤ 0.99 If (PO > 0.55 and Unc > 0.6) or ( PO < 0.45 and Unc < 0.29) 
P.MtP = 0 ≤ X ≤ 0.29 If (PO > 0.55 and Unc < 0.29) or (PO < 0.45 and Unc > 0.6) 
  0.3 ≤ X ≤ 0.59  
Where X߳ℝ
  0.6 ≤ X ≤ 0.99 If (R.MtP < 0.29 and P.MtP > 0.6) or (R.MtP > 0.6 and P.MtP < 0.29) 
R.MtS =  0 ≤ X ≤ 0.29 If (R.MtP < 0.29 and P.MtP < 0.29) or (R.MtP > 0.6 and P.MtP > 0.6) 
  0.3 ≤ X ≤ 0.59  
Where X߳ℝ
Where:
R.PtT = Recipient’s propensity to trust
R.MtP = Recipient’s motivation to process knowledge
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P.Tw = Propensity to trust
R.Tw = Recipients trustworthiness
P.PtT = Providers propensity to trust
P.MtP = Providers motivation to process knowledge
R.Mts = Recipients motivation to share knowledge
RE = Recipients extroversion
RA = Recipients agreeableness
RES = Recipients emotional stability
R.Tw = Recipients trustworthiness
RC = Recipients conscientiousness
RA = Recipients agreeableness
P.PtT = Providers propensity to trust
PE = Providers extroversion
PA = Providers agreeableness
PES = Providers emotional stability
P.Tw = Providers trustworthiness
PC = Providers conscientiousness
PA = Providers agreeableness
RO = Recipients openness
PO = Providers openness
Unc = Decision uncertainty
P.RP = Providers referent power
R.RP = Recipients referent power
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List of Table captions
Table 1. Six candidate case studies (shaded ones selected) with decision attributes
Table 2(a,b) Levels of intensity characterising (a) decision uncertainty; and (b) personality
trait, where “Random” refers to the option to select values using a random number generator.
Table 3. Showing relative levels of intensity (low, medium and high) assigned to each
personality, where “Random” refers to the option to select a value at random between 0 and 1
using the MS Excel® random number generator.
Table 4. Personalities that generate the ‘most’ and ‘least’ propensity to trust, trustworthiness
and referent power.
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List of Figure captions
Figure 1. Example decision route for the disposal of avian influenza (AI) infected carcasses,
having validated the flow and exchange of evidence between ‘provider’ and ‘recipient’.
Ultimate decision-maker is shown as Secretary of State (SoS; Davies, 2010), where TSE,
SEAC and DoH refers to ‘Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy’, ‘Spongiform
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee’ and Department of Health respectively.
Figure 2. TESLA representation of parent and child hypotheses for radioactive waste
disposal (adapted from Quintessa, 2008).
Figure 3. Logical flow of the deterministic two-agent model.
Figure 4. Sequence of events for updating agents’ receptivity according to changes in
personal information.
Figure 5. Logic for the confidence building exercise with questions asked by the agent-based
model sequentially in a clockwise order.
Figure 6. Mean recipient’s receptivity for 13 scenarios, with error bars representing standard
deviation.
Figure 7. Showing relative measures of (a) propensity to trust, (b) trustworthiness and (c)
referent power for each of the four personalities in the two agent model. Where ‘avoider-
high’ and ‘avoider-low’ personality is being calculated with high and low measures of
agreeableness and emotional stability respectively.
Figure 8. Boxplots showing low (1), medium (2) and high (3) values generated for
motivation to process evidence and motivation to share knowledge.
Figure 9 (a,b). Confidence gained over multiple submissions of evidence (a) where both
recipient and provider agents’ personalities are predisposed to being receptive; and (b) where
both are not predisposed to being receptive.
